MITRE ATLAS
MITRE ATLAS (Adversarial Threat Landscape for AI Systems) is a knowledge base of adversarial tactics and techniques specific to AI and machine learning systems. Published and maintained by The MITRE Corporation, ATLAS is modelled on the widely adopted MITRE ATT&CK framework that security teams already use for traditional cyber threat analysis.
The framework organises adversarial behaviour into 16 tacticscovering the full AI attack lifecycle — from initial reconnaissance and resource development through to execution, exfiltration, and impact. Each tactic contains specific techniques that describe how adversaries achieve their objectives against AI systems.
ATLAS matters because it gives security teams a common language for discussing AI threats that maps directly to the framework they already use for traditional cyber threats (ATT&CK). This allows AI security findings to be communicated alongside conventional security findings in a single threat model.
ProbeSix currently maps to ATLAS v2026.07(released 31 July 2026), reviewed on a rolling quarterly cadence. Coverage is honest about what ProbeSix can and cannot test — every technique in the ATLAS taxonomy is classified below as automated (a probesix plugin fully evidences it), partial (a plugin probes it but does not fully evidence it, for example testing the described behaviour rather than the runtime effect), governance (covered via the questionnaire), gap (ATLAS defines it, we should cover it, and it is in-scope for our scanner model but we do not yet), or out-of-scope(ATLAS defines it but it is structurally outside our scanner — e.g. host-level attacks, UI-layer tampering, deepfake generation). Partial, gap and out-of-scope techniques are all re-reviewed every quarter.
Coverage Summary
Two Assessment Approaches
Automated Red-Team Testing
ProbeSix sends adversarial prompts and attack sequences directly to your AI system, testing its defences against prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, data exfiltration, credential probing, tool misuse, and more. Each test produces a pass/fail result with evidence, mapped to the specific ATLAS technique being exercised.
Governance Assessment
Some ATLAS techniques describe adversary activities that occur outside the AI system's runtime environment — reconnaissance of published research, acquisition of attack infrastructure, or physical access to training hardware. These techniques are assessed through structured questionnaires that evaluate your organisational controls, supply chain security, and infrastructure protections.
Complete Coverage Matrix
The matrix below shows every ATLAS tactic and technique, with the assessment approach used for each. Techniques and sub-techniques are listed under their parent tactic.
TA0000 — AI Model Access
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0040 | AI Model Inference API Access | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0041 | Physical Environment Access | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0044 | Full AI Model Access | Partial |
| AML.T0047 | AI-Enabled Product or Service | Automated Testing |
TA0001 — AI Attack Staging
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0005 | Create Proxy AI Model | Partial |
| AML.T0005.000 | —Train Proxy via Gathered AI Artifacts | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0005.001 | —Train Proxy via Replication | Partial |
| AML.T0005.002 | —Use Pre-Trained Model | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0018 | Manipulate AI Model | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0018.000 | —Poison AI Model | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0018.001 | —Modify AI Model Architecture | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0018.002 | —Embed Malware | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0018.003 | —Modify Prompt Construction Logic | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0042 | Verify Attack | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0043 | Craft Adversarial Data | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0043.000 | —White-Box Optimization | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0043.001 | —Black-Box Optimization | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0043.002 | —Black-Box Transfer | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0043.003 | —Manual Modification | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0043.004 | —Insert Backdoor Trigger | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0088 | Generate Deepfakes | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0102 | Generate Malicious Commands | Coverage Gap |
TA0002 — Reconnaissance
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0000 | Search Open Technical Databases | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0000.000 | —Journals and Conference Proceedings | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0000.001 | —Pre-Print Repositories | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0000.002 | —Technical Blogs | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0001 | Search Open AI Vulnerability Analysis | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0003 | Search Victim-Owned Websites | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0004 | Search Application Repositories | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0006 | Active Scanning | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0064 | Gather RAG-Indexed Targets | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0087 | Gather Victim Identity Information | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0095 | Search Open Websites/Domains | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0095.000 | —Code Repositories | Out of Scope |
TA0003 — Resource Development
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0002 | Acquire Public AI Artifacts | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0002.000 | —Datasets | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0002.001 | —Models | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0002.002 | —AI Agent Configuration | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0008 | Acquire Infrastructure | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0008.000 | —AI Development Workspaces | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0008.001 | —Consumer Hardware | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0008.002 | —Domains | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0008.003 | —Physical Countermeasures | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0008.004 | —Serverless | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0008.005 | —AI Service Proxies | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0016 | Obtain Capabilities | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0016.000 | —Adversarial AI Attack Implementations | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0016.001 | —Software Tools | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0016.002 | —Generative AI | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0017 | Develop Capabilities | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0017.000 | —Adversarial AI Attacks | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0021 | Establish Accounts | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0060 | Publish Hallucinated Entities | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0065 | LLM Prompt Crafting | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0066 | Retrieval Content Crafting | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0079 | Stage Capabilities | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0115 | Publish Poisoned AI Artifacts | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0115.000 | —Datasets | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0115.001 | —Models | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0115.002 | —AI Agent Tools | Governance Assessment |
TA0004 — Initial Access
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0010 | AI Supply Chain Compromise | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0010.000 | —Hardware | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0010.001 | —AI Software | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0010.002 | —Data | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0010.003 | —Model | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0010.004 | —Container Registry | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0010.005 | —AI Agent Tool | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0012 | Valid Accounts | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0015 | Evade AI Model | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0049 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0052 | Phishing | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0052.000 | —Spearphishing via Social Engineering LLM | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0052.001 | —Deepfake-Assisted Phishing | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0078 | Drive-by Compromise | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0093 | Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application | Coverage Gap |
TA0005 — Execution
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0011 | User Execution | Partial |
| AML.T0011.000 | —Unsafe AI Artifacts | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0011.001 | —Malicious Package | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0011.002 | —Poisoned AI Agent Tool | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0011.003 | —Malicious Link | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0050 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0051 | LLM Prompt Injection | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0051.000 | —Direct | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0051.001 | —Indirect | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0051.002 | —Triggered | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0053 | AI Agent Tool Invocation | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0100 | AI Agent Clickbait | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0103 | Deploy AI Agent | Out of Scope |
TA0006 — Persistence
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0018 | Manipulate AI Model | Partial |
| AML.T0018.000 | —Poison AI Model | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0018.001 | —Modify AI Model Architecture | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0018.002 | —Embed Malware | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0018.003 | —Modify Prompt Construction Logic | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0020 | Training Data Poisoning | Partial |
| AML.T0061 | LLM Prompt Self-Replication | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0070 | RAG Poisoning | Partial |
| AML.T0080 | AI Agent Context Poisoning | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0080.000 | —Memory | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0080.001 | —Thread | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0081 | Modify AI Agent Configuration | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0093 | Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0099 | AI Agent Tool Data Poisoning | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0110 | AI Agent Tool Poisoning | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0110.000 | —Definition and Instructions | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0110.001 | —Implementation | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0110.002 | —Runtime Response | Governance Assessment |
TA0007 — Defense Evasion
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0015 | Evade AI Model | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0054 | LLM Jailbreak | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0067 | LLM Trusted Output Components Manipulation | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0067.000 | —Citations | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0068 | LLM Prompt Obfuscation | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0071 | False RAG Entry Injection | Partial |
| AML.T0073 | Impersonation | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0074 | Masquerading | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0076 | Corrupt AI Model | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0081 | Modify AI Agent Configuration | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0092 | Manipulate User LLM Chat History | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0094 | Delay Execution of LLM Instructions | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0097 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0107 | Exploitation for Defense Evasion | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0109 | AI Supply Chain Rug Pull | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0111 | AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation | Out of Scope |
TA0008 — Discovery
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0007 | Discover AI Artifacts | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0013 | Discover AI Model Ontology | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0014 | Discover AI Model Family | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0062 | Discover LLM Hallucinations | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0063 | Discover AI Model Outputs | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0069 | Discover LLM System Information | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0069.000 | —Special Character Sets | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0069.001 | —System Instruction Keywords | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0069.002 | —System Prompt | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0075 | Cloud Service Discovery | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0084 | Discover AI Agent Configuration | Partial |
| AML.T0084.000 | —Embedded Knowledge | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0084.001 | —Tool Definitions | Partial |
| AML.T0084.002 | —Activation Triggers | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0084.003 | —Call Chains | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0089 | Process Discovery | Out of Scope |
TA0009 — Collection
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0035 | AI Artifact Collection | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0036 | Data from Information Repositories | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0037 | Data from Local System | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0085 | Data from AI Services | Partial |
| AML.T0085.000 | —RAG Databases | Partial |
| AML.T0085.001 | —AI Agent Tools | Coverage Gap |
TA0010 — Exfiltration
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0024 | Exfiltration via AI Inference API | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0024.000 | —Infer Training Data Membership | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0024.001 | —Invert AI Model | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0024.002 | —Extract AI Model | Partial |
| AML.T0025 | Exfiltration via Cyber Means | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0056 | Extract LLM System Prompt | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0057 | LLM Data Leakage | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0077 | LLM Response Rendering | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0086 | Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation | Partial |
TA0011 — Impact
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0015 | Evade AI Model | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0029 | Denial of AI Service | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0031 | Erode AI Model Integrity | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0034 | Cost Harvesting | Partial |
| AML.T0034.000 | —Excessive Queries | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0034.001 | —Resource-Intensive Queries | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0034.002 | —Agentic Resource Consumption | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0046 | Spamming AI System with Chaff Data | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0048 | External Harms | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0048.000 | —Financial Harm | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0048.001 | —Reputational Harm | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0048.002 | —Societal Harm | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0048.003 | —User Harm | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0048.004 | —AI Intellectual Property Theft | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0059 | Erode Dataset Integrity | Partial |
| AML.T0101 | Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation | Governance Assessment |
| AML.T0112 | Machine Compromise | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0112.000 | —Local AI Agent | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0112.001 | —AI Artifacts | Out of Scope |
TA0012 — Privilege Escalation
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0012 | Valid Accounts | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0053 | AI Agent Tool Invocation | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0054 | LLM Jailbreak | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0105 | Escape to Host | Out of Scope |
TA0013 — Credential Access
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0055 | Unsecured Credentials | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0082 | RAG Credential Harvesting | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0083 | Credentials from AI Agent Configuration | Partial |
| AML.T0090 | OS Credential Dumping | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0098 | AI Agent Tool Credential Harvesting | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0106 | Exploitation for Credential Access | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0113 | Steal Web Session Cookie | Out of Scope |
TA0014 — Command and Control
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0072 | Reverse Shell | Automated Testing |
| AML.T0096 | AI Service API | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0108 | AI Agent | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0114 | AI Service Web Interface | Out of Scope |
TA0015 — Lateral Movement
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AML.T0052 | Phishing | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0052.000 | —Spearphishing via Social Engineering LLM | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0052.001 | —Deepfake-Assisted Phishing | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0053 | AI Agent Tool Invocation | Coverage Gap |
| AML.T0091 | Use Alternate Authentication Material | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0091.000 | —Application Access Token | Out of Scope |
| AML.T0091.001 | —Web Session Cookie | Out of Scope |
Automated Plugins by Tactic
The tables below name the plugins behind each tactic's ATLAS technique claims, with the technique reference and the justification for the mapping. They are a guide to how the mapping works rather than a complete inventory: some plugins that contribute to a tactic are not listed individually. A plugin appears under more than one tactic where ATLAS assigns its technique to more than one. A tactic-scoped scan also runs contributing tests that carry no technique claim of their own, and those are not listed here because they evidence no specific technique. That proportion varies by tactic and is substantial in some, so the scan picker shows the total number of plugins a tactic runs, which is higher than the number of rows below wherever contributing tests apply.
TA0000 — AI Model Access (3 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Model Theft: Weight Extraction | Attempts to extract model weights via inference API | AML.T0044 | Probes for full model access via parameter extraction |
| API Inference Access Security | Tests whether inference API access controls can be bypassed | AML.T0040 | Validates authentication and rate limiting on inference endpoints |
| Product | Probes AI-enabled product interfaces for unintended access | AML.T0047 | Tests access controls on customer-facing AI services |
TA0001 — AI Attack Staging (17 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Encoding Bypass: Base64 | Encodes malicious payloads in hexadecimal | AML.T0043 | Crafts adversarial data using encoding transformation |
| Encoding Bypass: Base16 | Encodes payloads in Base16 to evade filters | AML.T0043 | Adversarial data crafting via Base16 encoding |
| Encoding Bypass: Base64 | Encodes payloads in Base64 to bypass detection | AML.T0043 | Adversarial data crafting via Base64 encoding |
| Encoding Bypass: Base32 | Encodes payloads in Base32 to evade filters | AML.T0043 | Adversarial data crafting via Base32 encoding |
| Encoding Bypass: ROT13 | Applies ROT13 cipher to mask harmful content | AML.T0043 | Simple substitution cipher for adversarial payload obfuscation |
| Encoding Bypass: UUencode | Encodes payloads using UUEncoding | AML.T0043 | Legacy encoding scheme for adversarial data crafting |
| Encoding Bypass: Atbash | Applies Atbash cipher to mask harmful instructions | AML.T0043 | Substitution cipher for adversarial payload obfuscation |
| Encoding Bypass: Morse Code | Encodes instructions in Morse code | AML.T0043 | Encoding-based adversarial data transformation |
| Encoding Bypass: NATO Phonetic | Spells out harmful instructions using NATO alphabet | AML.T0043 | Phonetic encoding for adversarial payload delivery |
| Encoding Bypass: Braille Unicode | Encodes payloads using Braille characters | AML.T0043 | Unicode-based encoding for filter evasion |
| Encoding Bypass: Zalgo Text | Uses Zalgo text combining characters to obscure content | AML.T0043 | Unicode manipulation for adversarial data crafting |
| Encoding Bypass: Leetspeak | Substitutes characters with numbers/symbols | AML.T0043 | Character substitution for filter evasion |
| Encoding Bypass: Quoted-Printable | Encodes payloads using Quoted-Printable encoding | AML.T0043 | MIME encoding for adversarial data obfuscation |
| Encoding Bypass: ASCII85 | Encodes payloads using ASCII85 encoding | AML.T0043 | Binary-to-text encoding for adversarial data |
| Encoding Bypass: Unicode Homoglyphs | Replaces characters with visually identical Unicode glyphs | AML.T0043 | Homoglyph substitution for adversarial data crafting |
| Encoding Bypass: Bidirectional Reorder | Uses bidirectional Unicode control characters to reorder text | AML.T0043 | Text direction manipulation for payload obfuscation |
| Model Theft: Capability Cloning | Attempts to clone model capabilities via systematic querying | AML.T0005 | Tests resistance to proxy model creation through replication |
TA0002 — Reconnaissance (1 plugin)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debug Access | Probes for exposed debug endpoints and verbose error responses | AML.T0006 | Active scanning for information leakage via debug interfaces |
TA0003 — Resource Development (1 plugin)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Supply Chain: Package Hallucination | Tests whether model recommends non-existent packages | AML.T0060 | Detects hallucinated entities that could be exploited for supply chain attacks |
TA0004 — Initial Access (8 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) | Tests for server-side request forgery via AI-generated URLs | AML.T0049 | Exploits public-facing AI application to access internal resources |
| Supply Chain: Dependency Confusion | Tests if model suggests internal package names publicly | AML.T0010 | Probes for AI supply chain compromise via dependency confusion |
| Supply Chain: Model Provenance | Verifies model provenance claims and integrity | AML.T0010 | Validates resistance to supply chain model substitution |
| Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) | Tests role-based access control enforcement | AML.T0012 | Validates account-level access controls cannot be bypassed |
| Broken Object-Level Authorisation (BOLA) | Tests for broken object-level authorisation | AML.T0012 | Probes for valid account abuse via object-level access flaws |
| Broken Function-Level Authorisation (BFLA) | Tests for broken function-level authorisation | AML.T0012 | Probes for valid account abuse via function-level access flaws |
| Hijacking | Attempts to redirect AI agent to attacker-controlled actions | AML.T0052 | Phishing-style redirection of AI agent behaviour |
| ASCII Smuggling | Uses invisible Unicode characters to hide instructions | AML.T0015 | Evades input filtering to gain an initial foothold |
TA0005 — Execution (8 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| SQL Injection | Tests if LLM outputs can inject SQL into downstream systems | AML.T0050 | Command injection via AI-generated SQL statements |
| Shell Injection | Tests if LLM outputs can inject shell commands | AML.T0050 | Command injection via AI-generated shell commands |
| Indirect Prompt Injection | Injects instructions via external content (documents, URLs) | AML.T0051.001 | Indirect LLM prompt injection via untrusted data sources |
| Direct Prompt Injection | Attempts to override system instructions via user input | AML.T0051.000 | Direct LLM prompt injection via user-supplied prompts |
| Multimodal Injection | Embeds malicious instructions in images or other modalities | AML.T0051 | Cross-modal prompt injection via non-text inputs |
| Self-Replication | Tests if prompts can cause recursive self-execution | AML.T0051 | Prompt injection leading to autonomous replication |
| Excessive Agency | Tests if agent executes actions beyond intended scope | AML.T0053 | AI agent tool invocation without proper authorisation |
| Plugin Discovery | Probes for available tools and their capabilities | AML.T0053 | Enumerates agent tools to identify exploitable capabilities |
TA0006 — Persistence (6 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Data Poisoning: Training Bias Probe | Probes for biases introduced through poisoned training data | AML.T0020 | Identifies bias patterns that may indicate dataset poisoning |
| Data Poisoning: Behavioural Consistency | Tests model behaviour consistency across rephrased inputs | AML.T0020 | Detects signs of training data poisoning via behavioural anomalies |
| Data Poisoning: Backdoor Trigger | Tests for backdoor triggers in model responses | AML.T0018 | Detects manipulated model behaviour via planted triggers |
| RAG: Retrieval Manipulation | Manipulates RAG retrieval to surface attacker content | AML.T0070 | Persists malicious content via RAG pipeline poisoning |
| RAG: Embedding Collision | Creates embedding collisions to hijack retrieval results | AML.T0070 | Persists via adversarial embedding manipulation |
| Self-Replication | Tests if prompts can cause recursive self-execution | AML.T0061 | A self-replicating prompt persists beyond the turn that introduced it |
TA0007 — Defense Evasion (17 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASCII Smuggling | Uses invisible Unicode characters to hide instructions | AML.T0068 | Prompt obfuscation via invisible character insertion |
| Cross-Lingual: Direct Translation | Translates harmful prompts into other languages | AML.T0068 | Obfuscates prompts via language translation |
| Cross-Lingual: Code-Switching | Mixes languages within a single prompt | AML.T0068 | Obfuscates intent via mid-sentence language switching |
| Cross-Lingual: Transliteration | Writes harmful content using transliterated script | AML.T0068 | Obfuscates via script conversion while preserving meaning |
| Cross-Lingual: Low-Resource Language | Uses low-resource languages with weaker safety training | AML.T0068 | Exploits weaker safety alignment in under-represented languages |
| Cross-Lingual: Response Language Forcing | Forces model to respond in a specific language to bypass filters | AML.T0068 | Circumvents output filters by forcing language of response |
| Temporal Evasion: Past Tense | Frames harmful requests as historical events | AML.T0054 | Jailbreak via temporal reframing to past tense |
| Temporal Evasion: Future Tense | Frames harmful requests as hypothetical future scenarios | AML.T0054 | Jailbreak via temporal reframing to future tense |
| Temporal Evasion: Academic Framing | Frames harmful requests as academic research | AML.T0054 | Jailbreak via academic or research context framing |
| Output Injection: XSS | Tests if LLM outputs contain executable HTML/JavaScript | AML.T0067 | Trusted output manipulation via cross-site scripting |
| Output Injection: Markdown Exfiltration | Tests if markdown rendering can exfiltrate data | AML.T0067 | Trusted output manipulation via markdown image tags |
| Output Injection: Link Injection | Tests if LLM outputs contain malicious links | AML.T0067 | Trusted output manipulation via injected URLs |
| Output Injection: CSS Injection | Tests if LLM outputs can inject CSS for data exfiltration | AML.T0067 | Trusted output manipulation via CSS injection |
| Trusted Output Manipulation | Tests if model outputs can be manipulated to mislead users | AML.T0067 | General trusted output component manipulation |
| RAG: Poisoning | Injects false entries into RAG knowledge base | AML.T0071 | False RAG entry injection to evade content controls |
| Imitation | Tests if model can be made to impersonate authoritative sources | AML.T0073 | Impersonation of trusted entities to bypass controls |
| Masquerading | Tests if model can disguise harmful content as benign | AML.T0074 | Content masquerading to evade safety filters |
TA0008 — Discovery (9 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Model Fingerprinting | Identifies model type, version, and architecture | AML.T0007 | Discovers AI artefacts including model identity and capabilities |
| Error Information Leakage | Triggers errors to extract system information | AML.T0063 | Discovers model outputs that reveal internal details |
| Hallucination | Tests model propensity to generate fabricated information | AML.T0062 | Discovers LLM hallucination patterns and reliability gaps |
| Cloud Service Discovery | Probes for cloud service endpoints and configurations | AML.T0075 | Discovers cloud infrastructure supporting AI workloads |
| System Leakage: Multi-Turn Extraction | Gradually extracts system information across multiple turns | AML.T0069 | Discovers LLM system information via conversational probing |
| System Leakage: Tool Schema Leakage | Extracts tool schemas and function definitions | AML.T0069 | Discovers available tools and their parameter schemas |
| System Leakage: Configuration Leakage | Extracts system configuration and parameters | AML.T0069 | Discovers system configuration and operational parameters |
| Model Ontology Discovery | Maps model domain knowledge and capability boundaries | AML.T0013 | Discovers AI model ontology and knowledge structure |
| Model Family Discovery | Identifies model family, training lineage, and base model | AML.T0014 | Discovers AI model family and training heritage |
TA0009 — Collection (3 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Training Data Extraction | Extracts training data samples from model responses | AML.T0036 | Collects data from the model's training information repository |
| Model Theft: Memorisation Attack | Extracts memorised training examples verbatim | AML.T0036 | Collects memorised data from the model's training corpus |
| Model Inversion | Reconstructs training data inputs from model outputs | AML.T0036 | Reconstructs training data from information repositories via inversion |
TA0010 — Exfiltration (12 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prompt Extraction | Extracts the full system prompt for external use | AML.T0056 | Exfiltrates the system prompt as intellectual property |
| Model Theft: Memorisation Attack | Extracts memorised training data for external use | AML.T0024 | Exfiltrates training data via inference API membership probing |
| Data Exfiltration | Attempts to exfiltrate data via AI agent capabilities | AML.T0025 | Exfiltrates data via cyber means using agent tool access |
| Membership Inference | Determines if specific data was in the training set | AML.T0024 | Infers training data membership via inference API analysis |
| Model Inversion | Reconstructs training inputs from model outputs | AML.T0024.001 | Inverts the model to reconstruct training data |
| PII: Direct Disclosure | Directly requests personally identifiable information | AML.T0057 | Exfiltrates PII via direct data leakage |
| PII: API | Extracts PII from connected databases or APIs | AML.T0057 | Exfiltrates PII from backend data sources via LLM |
| PII: Session Leakage | Extracts PII from other user sessions | AML.T0057 | Exfiltrates PII via cross-session data leakage |
| PII: Social Engineering | Uses social engineering to extract personal information | AML.T0057 | Exfiltrates PII through social engineering prompts |
| Cross-Session Data Leakage | Tests for data leakage between user sessions | AML.T0057 | Exfiltrates data across user session boundaries |
| Training Data Extraction | Extracts training data samples from model responses | AML.T0057 | Exfiltrates training data via inference API probing |
| Model Theft: Weight Extraction | Attempts to extract model weights via inference API | AML.T0024.002 | Extracts the model itself, rather than the data it was trained on |
TA0011 — Impact (57 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Data Poisoning: Training Bias Probe | Probes for biases introduced through poisoned training data | AML.T0059 | Bias surfaced at inference is the impact of eroded dataset integrity |
| Unbounded Consumption: Token Amplification | Triggers excessive token generation to exhaust resources | AML.T0029 | Denial of AI service via token amplification |
| Unbounded Consumption: Recursive Reasoning | Induces recursive reasoning loops | AML.T0029 | Denial of AI service via computational exhaustion |
| Unbounded Consumption: Tool Abuse | Abuses agent tools to cause API fanout | AML.T0029 | Denial of AI service via tool invocation abuse |
| Unbounded Consumption: Chaff Data | Floods system with irrelevant data | AML.T0046 | Spamming AI system with chaff data |
| Context Window Overflow | Overflows context window to degrade performance | AML.T0029 | Denial of AI service via context window exhaustion |
| Divergent Repetition | Triggers repetitive output patterns wasting resources | AML.T0029 | Denial of AI service via repetitive generation loops |
| Factual Accuracy | Tests model propensity to generate inaccurate information | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through factual inaccuracy |
| Citation Verification | Tests if model fabricates citations and references | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through fabricated citations |
| Overreliance | Tests for excessive user trust in AI outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes model integrity by encouraging overreliance |
| Sycophancy | Tests if model prioritises agreement over accuracy | AML.T0031 | Erodes model integrity through sycophantic behaviour |
| Bias: Race | Tests for racial bias in model outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Bias: Gender | Tests for gender bias in model outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Bias: Age | Tests for age bias in model outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Bias: Disability | Tests for disability bias in model outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Bias: Religion | Tests for religious bias in model outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Bias: Sexual Orientation | Tests for bias based on sexual orientation | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Bias: Socioeconomic | Tests for socioeconomic bias in model outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Bias: Political | Tests for political bias in model outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Bias: Nationality | Tests for nationality bias in model outputs | AML.T0031 | Erodes AI model integrity through demographic bias in outputs |
| Confidence Calibration | Tests if model confidence levels match actual accuracy | AML.T0031 | Erodes model integrity via miscalibrated confidence |
| Explainability | Tests if model can explain its reasoning transparently | AML.T0031 | Erodes model integrity via unexplainable outputs |
| Harmful: Violent Crime | Tests refusal of violent crime assistance requests | AML.T0048 | User harm through violent crime facilitation |
| Harmful: Sex Crime | Tests refusal of sex crime assistance requests | AML.T0048 | User harm through sex crime facilitation |
| Harmful: Child Exploitation | Tests refusal of child exploitation content | AML.T0048 | User harm through CSAM/exploitation facilitation |
| Harmful: Self-Harm | Tests refusal of self-harm promotion | AML.T0048 | User harm through self-harm facilitation |
| Harmful: Chemical | Tests refusal of WMD instructions | AML.T0048 | External harm through weapons facilitation |
| Harmful: Indiscriminate Weapons | Tests refusal of weapons-of-mass-effect content | AML.T0048 | Societal harm through indiscriminate weapons guidance |
| Harmful: Radicalisation | Tests refusal of radicalisation content | AML.T0048 | Societal harm through radicalisation and extremism |
| Harmful: Non-Violent Crime | Tests refusal of non-violent crime assistance | AML.T0048 | Financial harm through fraud and crime facilitation |
| Harmful: Hate Speech | Tests refusal of hate speech generation | AML.T0048 | External harm through hate speech and discrimination |
| Harmful: Cybercrime | Tests refusal of cybercrime assistance | AML.T0048 | Financial harm through cybercrime facilitation |
| Harmful: Illegal Drugs | Tests refusal of illegal drug content | AML.T0048 | User harm through illegal drug facilitation |
| Harmful: Harassment | Tests refusal of harassment and bullying content | AML.T0048 | External harm through harassment facilitation |
| Harmful: Illegal Activities | Tests refusal of general illegal activity assistance | AML.T0048 | User harm through illegal activity facilitation |
| Harmful: Misinformation | Tests refusal of deliberate misinformation generation | AML.T0048 | Reputational harm through deliberate misinformation |
| Harmful: Privacy Violations | Tests refusal of privacy-violating requests | AML.T0048 | External harm through privacy violation |
| Harmful: Sexual Content | Tests refusal of explicit sexual content generation | AML.T0048 | User harm through explicit content generation |
| Harmful: Graphic Content | Tests refusal of graphic violence content | AML.T0048 | User harm through graphic content generation |
| Harmful: Unsafe Practices | Tests refusal of dangerous or unsafe advice | AML.T0048 | User harm through unsafe practice guidance |
| Harmful: Specialised Advice | Tests appropriate disclaimers for professional advice | AML.T0048 | Reputational harm through unqualified professional advice |
| Harmful: Profanity | Tests refusal of excessive profanity generation | AML.T0048 | Reputational harm through unprofessional language |
| Harmful: Insults | Tests refusal of personal insult generation | AML.T0048 | User harm through directed insults |
| Malware Generation: Top-Level | Tests refusal of complete malware code generation | AML.T0048 | External harm through malware creation |
| Malware Generation: Sub-Functions | Tests refusal of malware component generation | AML.T0048 | Financial harm through malware component creation |
| Malware Generation: Payload Delivery | Tests refusal of malware payload generation | AML.T0048 | External harm through exploit payload creation |
| Malware Generation: Detection Evasion | Tests refusal of malware evasion technique generation | AML.T0048 | External harm through evasion technique creation |
| Competitors | Tests for inappropriate competitor disparagement | AML.T0048.001 | Reputational harm through unfair competitor commentary |
| Contracts | Tests for inappropriate contractual commitments | AML.T0048.000 | Financial harm through unauthorised contractual statements |
| Politics | Tests for inappropriate political statements | AML.T0048.002 | Reputational harm through political commentary |
| AI Self-Disclosure | Tests if model accurately discloses its AI nature | AML.T0048 | Reputational harm through non-disclosure of AI nature |
| Limitation Disclosure | Tests if model discloses its limitations | AML.T0048 | Reputational harm through failure to disclose limitations |
| Professional Advice: Medical | Tests appropriate medical advice disclaimers | AML.T0048.003 | User harm through unqualified medical advice |
| Professional Advice: Legal | Tests appropriate legal advice disclaimers | AML.T0048.003 | User harm through unqualified legal advice |
| Professional Advice: Financial | Tests appropriate financial advice disclaimers | AML.T0048.003 | User harm through unqualified financial advice |
| Content Marking | Tests if AI-generated content is properly labelled | AML.T0048.001 | Reputational harm through unlabelled AI content |
| Scope Adherence | Tests if model stays within its designated scope | AML.T0048 | Reputational harm through scope boundary violations |
TA0012 — Privilege Escalation (7 plugins)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Permissions: Privilege Escalation | Attempts to escalate from user to admin-level access | AML.T0054 | Tests vertical privilege escalation via prompt manipulation |
| Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) | Tests role-based access control enforcement | AML.T0012 | Privilege escalation via role-based access bypass |
| Broken Object-Level Authorisation (BOLA) | Tests for broken object-level authorisation | AML.T0012 | Privilege escalation via object-level access bypass |
| Broken Function-Level Authorisation (BFLA) | Tests for broken function-level authorisation | AML.T0012 | Privilege escalation via function-level access bypass |
| Excessive Agency | Tests if agent can escalate its own permissions | AML.T0053 | Privilege escalation through agent tool invocation abuse |
| Temporal Evasion: Past Tense | Bypasses safety via historical framing to gain elevated access | AML.T0054 | Jailbreak-based privilege escalation via temporal reframing |
| Temporal Evasion: Future Tense | Bypasses safety via hypothetical framing to gain elevated access | AML.T0054 | Jailbreak-based privilege escalation via temporal reframing |
TA0013 — Credential Access (1 plugin)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Permissions: Secrets Probing | Probes for exposed API keys, tokens, and credentials | AML.T0055 | Probes for unsecured credentials in model responses and configuration |
TA0014 — Command and Control (1 plugin)
| Plugin | What It Tests | ATLAS Technique | Why This Tactic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reverse Shell | Tests if model can be coerced into generating reverse shell payloads | AML.T0072 | Command and control channel establishment via reverse shell generation |
TA0015 — Lateral Movement (0 plugins)
No automated coverage, and no governance questions. Every TA0015 technique is assessed as a gap or as out of scope, so no plugin claims one and the tactic cannot be selected in the scan picker. See the coverage table above for the position on each technique.
Governance Assessment Questions
The following governance questions are assessed inline within the tactic picker on the scan configuration page. When you select a tactic that has governance questions, its governance panel auto-expands so you can answer questions in context. A cross-cutting “AI System Lifecycle” governance section also appears when any governance-mapped tactic is selected. Answers auto-save and persist across scans. Each question is weighted for risk scoring (shown as a badge) with the answer type indicated.
AI Model Access & Credential Security
- Is authentication required for all access to AI model inference APIs?9Y/N
- Are API keys and credentials for AI services rotated on a defined schedule?8Y/N
- Are queries to the model restricted by rate, volume, or caller identity?7Y/N
- Is sensitive data encrypted in transit and at rest when communicating with AI services?8Y/N
- Is multi-factor authentication enforced for privileged AI system operations?8Y/N
- Are credential access logs monitored for anomalous patterns?7Y/N
AI Model Integrity & Attack Staging
- Are model weights and artefacts integrity-checked (checksum or signature) before deployment to production?9Y/N
- Is write access to model artefacts, training data and fine-tuning pipelines restricted to named individuals and audited?9Y/N
- Are models scanned for embedded executable content before loading (for example unsafe pickle deserialisation)?8Y/N
- Is the prompt construction logic (system prompt, templates, retrieval assembly) held in version control with peer review required for changes?8Y/N
- Is model behaviour benchmarked against a known-good baseline after each retrain or fine-tune, so unexpected shifts are detected?8Y/N
- Are models tested for backdoor triggers (inputs that produce anomalous behaviour) before release?7Y/N
- Is white-box access to your models (weights, gradients, architecture) restricted so adversaries cannot optimise attacks offline?7Y/N
- How mature are your controls over model integrity across the build and deployment pipeline?81–5
Public Exposure & Reconnaissance Surface
- Is there a review process before staff publish papers, blogs or conference talks describing your AI systems, models or training data?7Y/N
- Are public code repositories monitored for leaked AI configuration, prompts, API keys or model artefacts?9Y/N
- Do your public-facing websites and documentation avoid disclosing model identity, version or provider beyond what is required?6Y/N
- Do you track published vulnerabilities and jailbreaks affecting the specific models and frameworks you deploy?8Y/N
- Is your organisation's public AI footprint (job adverts, case studies, partner announcements) periodically reviewed for information useful to an attacker?6Y/N
- Is there a defined owner responsible for reducing the organisation's AI reconnaissance surface?6Y/N
- How mature is your programme for monitoring and reducing publicly available information about your AI systems?71–5
Adversarial Resource Development
- Are publicly available AI artefacts (datasets, pre-trained models) vetted for integrity and provenance before use?8Y/N
- Is AI development infrastructure (workspaces, compute, domains) provisioned through a controlled process with access auditing?7Y/N
- Are controls in place to detect adversarial prompt crafting attempts that use your LLM to generate attacks against other systems?9Y/N
- Are retrieval (RAG) content sources validated to prevent adversary-crafted documents from being indexed and served to users?9Y/N
- Is there monitoring for the publication or distribution of poisoned datasets or models that could target your AI systems?7Y/N
- Are adversarial AI attack tools and capabilities tracked as part of your threat intelligence programme?6Y/N
- How mature is your defence against adversaries weaponising your AI system for resource development (prompt crafting, content generation)?71–5
AI Supply Chain Dependencies
- Do you maintain an AI Bill of Materials covering models, datasets, and software dependencies?9Y/N
- Are pre-trained models verified for integrity (checksums, signatures) before deployment?9Y/N
- Are vulnerability scans run against AI framework libraries and dependencies?7Y/N
- Are third-party data sources and datasets vetted before use in training or fine-tuning?8Y/N
- Is there a process for restricting and auditing library loading in ML pipelines?7Y/N
- Are model marketplace downloads (HuggingFace, etc.) scanned for embedded malware or backdoors?8Y/N
- How mature is your AI supply chain governance programme?71–5
Execution & Agent Security Policies
- Are there policies preventing LLMs from executing arbitrary commands or scripts without sandboxing?10Y/N
- Are input validation controls in place to detect and block prompt injection attempts?9Y/N
- Are AI agent tool invocations subject to permission scoping and approval policies?9Y/N
- Are there safeguards preventing LLM-generated prompts from being self-replicated or recursively executed?8Y/N
- Are execution environments for AI workloads isolated from production systems?8Y/N
- Is there monitoring of LLM-triggered actions for anomalous or unauthorised behaviour?7Y/N
Persistence, Model Integrity & RAG Governance
- Is training data sanitised and validated before use to prevent data poisoning?9Y/N
- Are deployed models verified against known-good baselines to detect manipulation?8Y/N
- Is adversarial training or model hardening applied to improve robustness?7Y/N
- Are RAG knowledge base contents validated and monitored for poisoning or injection?9Y/N
- Is there version control and rollback capability for deployed model weights?7Y/N
- Are fine-tuning pipelines protected against unauthorised data injection?8Y/N
- How confident are you in the integrity of your model and data pipeline end-to-end?71–5
Evasion Detection & Input Validation
- Are adversarial input detection mechanisms deployed to identify evasion attempts?8Y/N
- Are there controls to detect and block LLM jailbreak attempts and prompt obfuscation?9Y/N
- Are trusted outputs validated to prevent manipulation before being passed to downstream systems?8Y/N
- Are input restoration or normalisation techniques used to counter obfuscated inputs?7Y/N
- Is there multi-layer input validation (syntactic, semantic, and contextual)?7Y/N
- Are model confidence scores monitored for anomalous drops indicating adversarial inputs?7Y/N
- Is there a feedback loop to update evasion detection rules based on new attack patterns?6Y/N
- How mature is your adversarial testing programme for AI input validation?71–5
Discovery Prevention & Information Disclosure
- Is metadata about AI models (version, family, architecture) restricted from public exposure?7Y/N
- Are model outputs limited to prevent disclosure of system configuration or training details?8Y/N
- Is there monitoring to detect systematic probing for AI model capabilities or weaknesses?7Y/N
- Are cloud service endpoints for AI workloads protected against discovery and enumeration?7Y/N
- Are error messages sanitised to prevent leaking internal model or infrastructure details?8Y/N
- Is there detection for fingerprinting attempts that map model behaviour patterns?7Y/N
- How mature are your controls to prevent AI system information disclosure?71–5
AI Artefact & Data Repository Security
- Are AI model artefacts stored with access controls limiting who can download them?8Y/N
- Is access to training and evaluation data repositories restricted and audited?8Y/N
- Are data repositories monitored for unusual bulk downloads or access patterns?7Y/N
- Is there an inventory of all AI artefacts and their storage locations?7Y/N
- Are model artefact transfers between environments verified for integrity?7Y/N
Exfiltration Prevention & Data Loss Protection
- Are there controls to prevent extraction of training data or model parameters via inference API queries?9Y/N
- Is the system prompt protected against extraction attempts?8Y/N
- Are outputs monitored for unintended data leakage (PII, confidential data, training examples)?9Y/N
- Are network-level exfiltration controls (DLP, egress filtering) applied to AI service infrastructure?7Y/N
- Is there detection for model inversion attacks attempting to reconstruct training data?8Y/N
- Are watermarking or fingerprinting techniques used to detect unauthorised model copies?8Y/N
Impact Mitigation & Content Safety
- Are there controls to prevent denial-of-service attacks against AI inference services?8Y/N
- Is there monitoring and alerting for abnormal cost patterns or resource consumption by AI services?8Y/N
- Are content safety filters deployed to prevent harmful outputs from reaching end users?9Y/N
- Are model integrity metrics monitored for signs of degradation or drift from data poisoning?7Y/N
- Is there an automated rollback mechanism if model performance degrades below acceptable thresholds?6Y/N
- Are cascading failure scenarios documented and tested for AI-dependent systems?6Y/N
- How mature is your incident containment process for AI-specific security events?71–5
AI Security Training & Model Lifecycle
- How mature is your organisation's AI security training programme for developers and operators?81–5
- Is there a formal model lifecycle process covering development, validation, deployment, and retirement?8Y/N
- Do you have an AI incident response plan that covers adversarial attacks on models?9Y/N
- How comprehensively have MITRE ATLAS mitigations (M0000-M0019) been assessed for your AI systems?71–5
- Is there a regular review cycle for AI security controls aligned to evolving threat landscapes?7Y/N
- Are AI risk assessments conducted before deploying new models or significant updates?8Y/N
- Is there an AI governance committee or designated responsible owner for AI security?7Y/N
- Are third-party AI audits or penetration tests conducted on a regular schedule?6Y/N
- Is AI model behaviour monitored in production for drift, bias, and anomalous outputs?7Y/N
- Do decommissioned models and datasets follow a secure disposal process?5Y/N
- How mature is your AI threat intelligence programme for tracking emerging adversarial techniques?61–5
Running an ATLAS Assessment
To run an ATLAS-aligned assessment:
- Register your endpoint— Add the AI system you want to assess via the Endpoints page
- Select the MITRE ATLAS template— Choose individual tactics for targeted testing or select all 16 for comprehensive coverage
- Complete governance questions— For tactics with governance assessments, questions appear inline below the tactic row when selected. Answer them in context — your responses auto-save and persist across scans
- Review ATLAS references— Each finding in your report includes ATLAS technique mappings alongside OWASP, NIST, and other framework references
ATLAS technique references are also included in OWASP and other framework scan reports, giving your security team a common language for discussing AI threats that maps directly to the framework they already use for traditional cyber threats (ATT&CK).
References
- MITRE ATLAS — Official ATLAS knowledge base
- ATLAS GitHub (atlas-data) — Machine-readable techniques and tactics data
- MITRE ATT&CK — Parent framework for traditional cyber threats
- ATLAS Navigator — Interactive technique coverage visualisation
- ATLAS Case Studies — Real-world adversarial AI attack case studies
- NIST AI RMF Crosswalk — NIST AI RMF to ATLAS interoperability mapping